Assume in a 2-person game that one player, Predictor (P), does not have a dominant strategy but can predict with probability p > 1/2 the strategy choice of an opponent, Predictee (Q). Q chooses a strategy that maximizes her expected payoff, given that she knows p-but not P's prediction-and that P will act according to his prediction.
Introduction
In this paper, we analyze a set of 2-person games, which we call "prediction games," in which a one player, Predictor (P) (assumed male), does not have a dominant strategy but can predict with probability p > 1/2 the strategy choice of the other player, Predictee (Q) (assumed female), who may or may not have a dominant strategy. In our model, Q knows p and that P will act according to his prediction, and she chooses a strategy to maximize her expected payoff.
For simplicity, we restrict most but not all our analysis to 2 2 strict ordinal games, in which each player has two strategies and there are four possible outcomes. The players strictly rank the four outcomes from best to worst, so each player's payoffs, which are expressed in cardinal utilities that reflect their rankings, are different.
Of the 57 2 2 distinct "conflict games," wherein there is no mutually best outcome, we focus on the 32 (56%) in which at most one player has a dominant strategy. 1 In these games, P is the player or one of the players who lacks a dominant strategy. Not having such a strategy, P is motivated to try to predict Q's choice in order to determine his own optimal choice. We show that in exactly eight of these 32 games (25%), which fall into two classes, good predictions by P can obviate two significant problems, thereby enabling the players to implement a Pareto-optimal outcome in these games that is not a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium but is at least the next-best outcome for both players:
1 For a complete listing of the 57 games, see Brams, 1994 Brams, , 2011 . Bruns (2015) offers a different listing and classification of these games. Later, when we distinguish between the roles of P and Q, we will see that, except for six symmetric games, the 51 asymmetric games bifurcate into two games each, depending on which player is P and which is Q. 2 In Newcomb's problem, there may be a conflict between maximizing one's expected payoff and choosing a dominant strategy, which is analyzed in Brams (1975) when Newcomb's problem is treated as a game. The Class II prediction games discussed in section 4 pose this problem, wherein we assume Q's choice is × × • Class I (5 games): There is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies; furthermore, the equilibrium outcome in mixed strategies is Pareto-inferior to the Paretooptimal non-Nash outcome.
• Class II (3 games): There is a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium outcome, but it is Pareto-inferior to the Pareto-optimal non-Nash outcome.
For each class, we show that good predictions by P, when incorporated into the players' rational-choice calculations, stabilize the Pareto-optimal non-Nash outcome, which we call a "cooperative outcome" because it is at least the next-best outcome for both players.
Thus, in these problematic games, there is a way of achieving outcomes preferable for both players to the Nash-equilibrium outcome (pure or mixed).
We analyze two international conflicts, the first modeled by a Class I game and the second by a Class II game. The first is between the United States and the Soviet Union during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the second is between Iran and Israel over Iran's possible development of nuclear weapons in 2015.
In both conflicts, a cooperative outcome halted further escalation, and possibly war, between the antagonists. In the specific prediction game modeling each conflict, one country's (P's) prediction about what its opponent (Q) would do seems to have played a major, and if not decisive, role in attenuating the conflict and inducing both countries to reach a settlement.
An important lesson from our analysis is that even in the two classes of troublesome games in which the unique cooperative outcome cannot be supported in equilibrium, there is hope for achieving it if at least one player (P) can predict with a high enough probability the behavior of an opponent (Q). Knowing this, Q will choose a cooperative strategy, which P will have predicted with this probability and Q, in turn, will have used in deciding to cooperate. Making available to policy makers better information about the choices of adversaries, and their likelihood, will tend to foster interlocking cooperative decisions.
The 2 2 Model
Assume Q has two strategies, s 1 and s 2 , and P has two strategies, t 1 and t 2 , leading to the four possible outcomes in the 2 × 2 game shown in Figure 1 . Q's payoffs, a ij , and P's payoffs, b ij , at each outcome are assumed to be cardinal utilities (see Figure 1 ). Thus, if P predicts Q will choose s 1 , he will choose t 1 ; if P predicts Q will choose s 2 , he will choose t 2 . Consequently, if Q knows that P will predict her choice with perfect accuracy (i.e., p = 1), then Q does best by choosing her strategy, s 1 or s 2 , consistent with her, but not P's, preference between the two diagonal outcomes, (a 11 , b 11 ) and (a 22 , b 22 ). If P and Q prefer different diagonal outcomes, then P's ability to make perfect predictions means that he will correctly predict whether Q will choose s 1 or s 2 . 3 Knowing this, Q will choose her strategy that yields the greater of b 11 and b 22 .
Figure 1. 2 2 Payoff Matrix
More generally, assume that P predicts Q's choice correctly with probability p > ½ (and incorrectly with probability 1-p < ½). Q knows not only her own payoffs and p but also that P will choose his strategy in accordance with his prediction. Therefore, if Q chooses s 1 , P will • correctly predict her choice with probability p and choose t 1 , giving her a payoff of a 11 ; or • incorrectly predict her choice with probability 1-p and choose t 2 , giving her a 2 In Newcomb's problem, there may be a conflict between maximizing one's expected payoff and choosing a dominant strategy, which is analyzed in Brams (1975) when Newcomb's problem is treated as a game. The Class II prediction games discussed in section 4 pose this problem, wherein we assume Q's choice is determined by her expected-payoff calculation. 3 Perfect predictions imply that P has a perfectly informed spy, or is omniscient, which can lead to a "paradox of omniscience" (Brams, 1994 (Brams, , 2011 , whereby P-in terms of the players' comparative rankings of outcomes-does worse than Q. This paradox occurs in six of the 2 2 strict ordinal games, all with two pure-strategy equilibria (including Chicken, which we discuss later). None of these games coincides with those analyzed here, wherein perfect predictions induce cooperative outcomes that P never ranks lower than Q. × payoff of a 12 .
Thus, Q's expected payoff from choosing s 1 is EQ(s 1 ) = a 11 p + a 12 (1-p). Similarly, if Q chooses s 2 , Q's expected payoff from choosing s 2 is EQ(s 2 ) = a 22 p + a 21 (1-p).
It follows that Q prefers s 1 to s 2 (or is indifferent) when EQ(s 1 ) ≥ EQ(s 1 ):
which is equivalent to p[(a 11 -a 22 ) + (a 21 -a 12 )] ≥ (a 21 -a 12 ).
Define differences Δ 1 = a 21a 12 and Δ 2 = a 11a 22 . Then we have that Q prefers s 1 to s 2 (or is indifferent), which we write as s 1 ≽ s 2 , if and only if
A parallel calculation shows that s 2 ≥ s 1 if and only if the direction of inequality (1) is reversed.
Because, as we assumed earlier, the players' payoffs are all different, Δ 1 and Δ 2 are never zero. The four cases, given in Table 1 below, show how these values determine whether Q prefers s 1 or s 2 (or is indifferent). In cases 2 and 3, Q's best choice is simple:
Always select s 2 in case 2 and s 1 in case 3, whatever the value of p. In cases 1 and 4, "p is large enough" and "p is small enough," depend on whether p is larger than or smaller than the threshold value,
Note that p t is well-defined in cases 1 and 4, because + cannot equal zero since both summands the same sign. Also, 0 < p t < 1. 
To clarify the play of a 2 2 prediction game between P and Q, we present the following timeline:
1. P makes a prediction of whether Q will choose s 1 or s 2 .
2. If P predicts that Q will choose s 1 , he chooses t 1 ; if P predicts that Q will choose s 2 , he chooses t 2 .
3. Q chooses s 1 or s 2 optimally, knowing that P's prediction of her strategy is correct with probability p and incorrect with probability 1-p:
• in case 1, Q will choose s 1 if p > p t , be indifferent between s 1 and s 2 if p = p t , and choose s 2 if p < p t .
• in case 4, Q will choose s 1 if p < p t , be indifferent between s 1 and s 2 if p = p t , and choose s 2 if p > p t .
• in cases 2 and 3, Q's optimal choice does not depend on p; she will always choose s 2 in case 2 and s 1 in case 3.
We emphasize that P's choice in step 2, and Q's choice is step 3, are made independently of each other. While Q knows p, she does not know P's actual choice so bases her choice on an expected-payoff calculation.
We do not attempt to explain the basis of P's prediction, but presumably it depends on intelligence and other information that P is able to obtain about Q's probable behavior. In particular, P's prediction does not depend on Q's payoffs in the 2 2 game, which may be known only to Q.
In sum, we assume that Q has no information on P's likely behavior, but what she does know is the accuracy of P's prediction about her behavior (i.e., p) and that P will act according to his prediction. Knowing her own payoffs, Q is able to calculate p t and ascertain, in cases 1 and 4, whether she is better off choosing s 1 or s 2 (or is indifferent)based on her expected payoff-whereas in cases 2 and 3, as noted earlier, her optimal choice is independent of p.
We can, in fact, generalize the foregoing reasoning to any 2-person game (not just 2 2 games) to show how Q can select one pure-strategy Nash equilibrium out of many when predictions by P are perfect (i.e., p = 1). In any such game with two or more purestrategy Nash equilibria, Q should evaluate each of her strategies in the following way: If no Nash equilibria coincide with strategy s, ignore this strategy; if only one Nash equilibrium coincides with strategy s, then evaluate s as Q's payoff at the equilibrium; if more than one Nash equilibrium coincides with strategy s, then evaluate s as Q's payoff at the equilibrium that P most prefers. Then Q should select her equilibrium strategy with the highest evaluation. Of course, because of continuity, this procedure will be optimal for values of p close enough to 1. × ×
Distinguishing the Predictor and the Predictee in 2 × 2 Games
Because P does not have a dominant strategy, as we assumed in section 2, he would like to predict Q's strategy choice as accurately as possible. The more accurate P's prediction is, the more likely he will obtain the outcome he prefers between the two realized by his best responses to each of Q's strategies, s 1 or s 2 .
Because there are infinitely many 2 2 games, it is useful to classify them according to each player's ranking of the four cardinal outcomes, where 4 = best; 3 = next best; 2 = next worst; 1 = worst.
Any 2 2 game in which neither player is indifferent between any two outcomes can be transformed into a strict ordinal game in this way.
If games are identical except for the naming of strategies (i.e., when the two players, A and B, are not distinguished), there are 144 distinct 2 2 strict ordinal games.
Of these, 12 are symmetric: They present the players with the same strategic choices.
In the remaining 132 games, the strategic choice problems of the row and column players are fundamentally different. More specifically, there are 12 + (½ 132) = 78 distinct strict ordinal 2 2 games that do not distinguish between players A and B: None of these games can be transformed into any other by any combination of the operations of interchanging the players, interchanging the rows, or interchanging the columns (Rapoport, Gordon, and Guyer, 1976) . Of the 78 games, 21 have a mutually best (4,4) outcome; in the remaining 57 games, which we call conflict games, there is no such outcome.
In Figure 2a we give one of these games, which is game 46 in Brams (1994 Brams ( , 2011 . It can be transformed into the game in Figure 2b , which we call game 46t ("t" for 
In both games, we assume that the column player is P and the row player is Q.
Although these games are strategically equivalent with respect to the aforementioned transformation, they give very different results when we distinguish the Predictor and the Predictee.
To illustrate this difference, assume the ordinal ranks are cardinal utilities. 4 In the Figure 2a game, = 4 -2 = 2 and = 3 -1 = 2, which fits case 1 and yields p t = ½, so any p > ½ would induce A as Q to choose s 1 . But in the Figure 2b game, = 1 -2 = -1 and = 4 -3 = 1, which fits case 3 and would induce B (now Q) always to choose s 1 (p t is defined and used only in cases 1 and 4 in Table 1 ). 4 We treat the ranks as utilities only for illustrative purposes. When the players' utilities are different from the ranks but consistent with them (i.e., the players' utilities can ordered from best to worst in the same order as the ranks), the value of p t will be different, as we illustrate below.
In the Figure 2a game, Q's (A's) optimal choice depends on whether p is greater or less than the threshold probability p t , whereas in the Figure 2b game Q's (B's) optimal choice does not depend on p-she will always choose s 2 . In the Figure 2a game, if P's predictions are better than random (i.e., p > ½), then Q will choose s 1 .
If Q's cardinal values in the Figure 2a game associated with ranks (4, 3, 2, 1) were (9, 3, 2, 1), then = 9 -2 = 7 and = 3 -1 = 2, yielding p t = 7/9 = 0.78. Thus, only if p exceeds 78% would Q be induced to choose s 1 in the Figure 2a game. But this is not the case in the Figure 2b game, even when the utilities are (9, 8, 7, 1), because the game of Figure 2b is a case 1 game.
When we distinguish the roles of P and Q, we render the games in Figure 2a and 2b different in our prediction model. We always arrange for P to be the column player, as stated earlier, which accounts for the difference between the Figure 2a and Figure 2b games.
In a symmetric 2 2 ordinal game, each player faces the same strategic choices.
In these games, the strategies can be ordered so that the players rank the two maindiagonal outcomes the same, and the rankings of the two off-diagonal outcomes become mirror images of each other: If the ranks of one are (a, b), with a ≠ b, then the ranks of the other are (b, a). (Prisoners' Dilemma and Chicken are examples of symmetric but not prediction games, which we refer to later.) Because P and Q assume the same role in a symmetric game-whoever is the row or column player-these games do not give rise to a different prediction games when the row and column players are interchanged.
Of the 144 distinct 2 2 ordinal games when P and Q are distinguished, 36 have a mutually best (4,4) outcome, which we call no-conflict games. Thus, there are 108
conflict games, in which there is no mutually best outcome, when P and Q are distinguished. Of the 108 conflict games, 6 are symmetric and 102 are not, which implies that there are 6 + (½ 102) = 57 different conflict games-a figure we obtained in a different way earlier-prior to the assignment of roles to P and Q.
Of the 57 conflict games, we focus in section 4 on the eight games (14%) in which there is one Pareto-inferior or no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium and a Paretooptimal non-Nash outcome that is at least next-best for both players. 5 In all these games, we show that if P's prediction probability p is sufficiently high, the players are induced to behave so as to attain the Pareto-optimal non-Nash outcome with this probability, which benefits both players compared with the Nash equilibrium outcome.
When Good Predictions Induce a Non-Nash Cooperative Outcome
We begin with the five Class I games, shown in Figure 3 , in which there is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Games 46 and 47 are as given in Brams (1994 Brams ( , 2011 , whereas games 29t, 30t, and 31t are the transformed counterparts of the games with the same numbers. However, the roles of P and Q are interchanged and the players' strategies are reversed in some cases. 6 These five games are the 2 2 strict ordinal games that satisfy the following conditions:
• There is no mutually best (4,4) outcome.
• P has no dominant strategy.
• There are no Nash equilibria (in pure strategies). 5 There is one Pareto-inferior Nash equilibrium in Prisoners' Dilemma (game 32), but it is not a prediction game because P (as well as Q) has a dominant strategy. Recall that in a prediction game, P bases his strategy choice on his prediction of the strategy that Q will choose precisely because the P does not have a dominant strategy. 6 This reversal may be required to make the Pareto-optimal non-Nash outcome the upper right entry of the payoff matrix in the transformed game, as illustrated in Figure 3 for Class I prediction games.
× ×
• The (s 1 , t 1 ) outcome is Pareto-optimal
• The (s 1 , t 1 ) outcome is cooperative, offering both players at least a nextbest outcome (i.e., a 11 ≥ 3 and b 11 ≥ 3).
• > 0 and > 0.
Class I games fall into Case 1 in Table 1 : A sufficiently high prediction probability stabilizes the cooperative (s 1 , t 1 ) outcome, even though it is not a Nash equilibrium (there are none) and even though neither s 1 nor t 1 is a dominant strategy.
Figure 3. Five Class I Games (No Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium)
Game 46
If Q's ranks are cardinal utilities, then Q will choose s 1 if p exceeds the prediction threshold, which is p t = ½ in all five games. P will choose t 1 with probability p, which will lead to the cooperative outcome (a 11 , b 11 ) with this probability, and to (a 12 , b 12 ) with probability 1-p. As p approaches 1, the cooperative outcome will be achieved with ever greater certainty, even though it is not a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
More generally, if p < 1, the imperfect predictions of P imply that he will not always choose t 1 , but sometimes t 2 , when Q chooses s 1 . Consequently, the outcome if Q chooses s 1 will be the following mix of payoffs:
If p = 1, as noted above, the cooperative outcome (a 11 , b 11 ) occurs with certainty.
We turn next to the three Class II games, which are the 2 2 strict ordinal games that satisfy the following conditions:
• Q has a dominant strategy that includes a Pareto-inferior pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
• The (s 1 , t 1 ) outcome is cooperative, Pareto-optimal, and preferred by Q to the (s 2 , t 2 ) outcome (which is the Pareto-inferior Nash equilibrium).
In Figure 4 , the Nash equilibrium is starred, and the non-Nash outcome that sufficiently accurate predictions can stabilize is underscored. 7 Figure 4 . Three Class II Games (One Pareto-Inferior Nash Equilibrium) 7 Because games 27, 28, and 48 are not symmetric, they have counterparts in which the roles of P and Q are interchanged. However, in these counterpart games, the Predictor has a dominant strategy, so they are not prediction games. In these games, P will presumably choose his dominant strategy in lieu of trying to predict the Q's choice, even though it can be expected to lead to a Pareto-inferior Nash-equilibrium outcome. The same problem bedevils Prisoners' Dilemma (game 32, which is not shown), a symmetric game in which both players have dominant strategies that yield a Pareto-inferior Nash equilibrium outcome. While good predictions in our model do not offer an escape from games in which the Predictor has a dominant strategy, other game-theoretic models with prediction probabilities do; see, for example, the model of arms races in Brams, Davis, and Straffin (1979) . 1) (4,1) (2,3)* (4,1) (2,2)* (4,2) (2,3)* What is noteworthy in the Class II prediction games is that Q is best served by abandoning her dominant strategy, s 2 , and instead choosing her dominated strategy, s 1 , if p is sufficiently high. If the ranks are assumed to be cardinal utilities, the threshold probability p t is ¾ in each of these games. The outcome that results with probability p,
(3,4), favors P, giving him his best outcome and Q her next-best outcome.
Altogether, there are a total of eight prediction games in Figures 3 and 4 . They constitute 14% of the 57 conflict games and include all games in which there is (i) either no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies or a Pareto-inferior Nash equilibrium and (ii) a non-Nash Pareto-optimal cooperative outcome. All these games yield the cooperative outcome with probability p, and the adjacent outcome in the same row (s 1 , t 2 ) with probability (1-p), if p > p t . At the non-Nash cooperative outcomes in these games, P does at least as well and sometimes better-in terms of comparative rankings of payoffs-as Q.
The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Class I Game
There is a prodigious literature on the Cuban missile crisis, which several analysts have modeled as a game of Chicken in which the two superpowers are seen to be on a collision course. 8 Brams (1994 Brams ( , 2011 has disputed the Chicken interpretation and proposed an alternative game, which is a comparison we will discuss shortly. accurately, their leaders-managed this crisis has been described in great detail, but this scrutiny has involved little in the way of formal strategic analysis. 9
After the presence of such missiles was confirmed on October 14, the Central Intelligence Agency estimated that they would be operational in about ten days. A socalled Executive Committee (ExCom) of high-level officials was convened to decide on a course of action for the United States. ExCom met in secret for six days. The comments of Theodore Sorensen, special counsel and advisor to President John F. Kennedy, on its deliberations reflect well the game-theoretic thinking of its members:
We discussed what the Soviet reaction would be to any possible move by the United States, what our reaction with them would have to be to that Soviet reaction, and so on, trying to follow each of these roads to their ultimate conclusion (quoted in Holsti, 1964, p. 188) .
The goal of the United States was immediate removal of the Soviet missiles, and U.S. policy makers considered several strategies, eventually narrowed to two: weeks later. Collision Course is actually the title of the first book on this crisis (Pachter, 1963) , and Eyeball to Eyeball it the title of another book on the crisis (Brugoni, 1992) , 9 Exceptions include the game-theoretic models of Snyder and Diesing (1977) , Fraser and Hipel (1982-83) , Brams (1985 Brams ( , 1990 , and Dixit, Skeath, and Reilly (2015) . l. A naval blockade (B), or "quarantine" as it was euphemistically called, to prevent shipment of further missiles, possibly followed by stronger action to induce the Soviet Union to withdraw those missiles already installed. Nuclear war (1,1) 10 The description of Chicken, and the alternative game we propose to model the crisis, are adapted from Brams (1994 Brams ( , 2011 , but our explanation for the outcome of the crisis is based on our prediction model, not on the "theory of moves" that is developed and applied in these books. 11 The superpowers are modeled as unitary actors. This simplification has been rectified in part by constructing alternative models that emphasize different features of crisis decision-making (e.g., in Allison, 1971 ).
A "surgical
Of course, there is no way to verify that the strategy choices and probable outcomes given in Figure 5 were the most likely ones, or that the Chicken rankings are the most appropriate. For example, if the Soviet Union had viewed an air strike on its missiles as jeopardizing vital national interests, the (4,2) outcome may very well have ended in nuclear war between the two sides, giving it the same value as (1,1 which seems to indicate that the eventual outcome was a compromise resolution of sorts. 13 Moreover, even though the Soviets responded specifically to the blockade that was imposed and, therefore, did not make the choice of their strategy independently of the American strategy choice, the fact that the United States held out the possibility of escalating the conflict to at least an air strike indicates that the initial blockade decision was not considered final-that is, the United States considered other strategic options still open after the blockade was imposed. 12 For several books on the crisis not cited here, which use different sources and emphasize different aspects of the crisis, see Brams (2011, p. 228, note 13) . 13 A release of letters between Kennedy and Khrushchev, however, indicates that Kennedy's promise was conditional on the good behavior of Cuba (Pear, 1992) .
Truly, this was a game of sequential bargaining, in which each side did not make an all-or-nothing choice but instead considered alternatives should the other side fail to respond in a manner considered appropriate. Facing the most serious breakdown in the deterrence relationship between the superpowers that had persisted since World War II, each side was carefully feeling its way, step by ominous step.
Before the crisis, the Soviets, fearing an invasion of Cuba by the United States and also the need to bolster their international strategic position, concluded that it was worth the risk of installing the missiles; they believed that, confronted by a fait accompli, the United States, in all likelihood, would be deterred from invading Cuba and would not attempt any other severe reprisals (Garthoff, 1989) . The Soviet calculation suggests that it thought there was a relatively low probability of nuclear war, 14 thereby making it rational to risk provoking the United States.
Although this thinking may be more or less correct, there are good reasons to believe that U.S. policy makers viewed the game not to be Chicken at all, at least as far as they ranked the possible outcomes. In Figure 6 , we offer an alternative representation of the Cuban missile crisis, retaining the same strategies for both players as given in the Chicken representation ( Figure 5 ), but we assume a different ranking of outcomes by the United States.
The resulting game is game 30t which, unlike Chicken, is a Class I prediction game. 15 Its outcomes may be interpreted as follows:
BW : (3,3) . The choice of blockade by the United States and withdrawal by the Soviet Union remains the cooperative outcome for both players. (1,4) . In the face of a U.S. blockade, Soviet maintenance of their missiles leads to a Soviet victory (its best outcome) and U.S. capitulation (its worst outcome). (4,1) . An air strike that destroys the missiles that the Soviets were maintaining is an "honorable" U.S. action (its best outcome) and thwarts the Soviets (their worst outcome). (2,2) . An air strike that destroys the missiles that the Soviets were withdrawing is a "dishonorable" U.S. action (its next-worst outcome) and thwarts the Soviets (their next-worst outcome).
BM:
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AW:
Figure 6. Cuban Missile Crisis (Game 30t)
United States
Blockade: B Even though an air strike thwarts the Soviets in the case of the outcomes with payoffs of (2,2) and (4,1), we interpret (2,2) to be a less damaging outcome for the Soviet Union. This is because world opinion, we surmise, would severely condemn the air strike as a flagrant overreaction-and hence a "dishonorable" U.S. choice-if there were clear evidence that the Soviets were in the process of withdrawing their missiles anyway.
On the other hand, given no such evidence, a U.S. air strike, perhaps followed by an invasion, would probably be viewed by U.S. policy makers as a necessary, if not an "honorable," action to dislodge the Soviet missiles.
Before analyzing these possibilities, however, we offer a brief justificationmainly in the words of the participants-for the alternative representation given by game If you would agree to remove these weapons systems from Cuba . . . we, on our part, would agree . . . (a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect and (b) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba (Allison, 1971, p. 228 ).
This statement is consistent with the game 30t representation of the crisis [because (3, 3) is preferred to (2,2) by the United States] but not consistent with the Chicken (game 57) representation [because (4,2) is preferred to (3,3) by the United States].
Did the United States prefer an air strike to the blockade, given that the Soviets would maintain their missiles? According to Robert Kennedy, a close adviser to his brother during the crisis, "If they did not remove those bases, we would remove them" (Kennedy, 1969, p. 170 This statement is consistent with the United States's ranking AW next worst (2)-a "dishonorable" U.S. action in the game 30t representation-rather than best (4)-a U.S. victory in the Chicken representation.
If game 30t ( Figure 6 ) provides a more realistic representation of the participants' perceptions than does Chicken ( Figure 5 ), game theory offers little in the way of explaining how the cooperative (3,3) outcome was achieved and rendered stable. After all, this outcome, as in Chicken, is not Nash equilibrium outcome and, as noted earlier, no other pure-strategy outcome is.
How then can we explain the choice of (3,3) by both sides? As a prediction game, assume the United States is P and attempts to predict whether the Soviet Union will withdraw or maintain its missiles after the blockade.
We believe President Kennedy chose blockade after predicting, or at least hoping, that it would be sufficient to induce the Soviet Union to withdraw its missiles: It would force Khrushchev to choose between the serious embarrassment of withdrawal and the dire consequence of war if he did not do so, including a possible nuclear exchange.
Obviously, the Soviets would prefer (3,3) in game 30t to being thwarted at (4,1). In fact, Khrushchev believed that if the United States protested but took no countermeasures after the deployment of missiles in Cuba, he could make their withdrawal contingent on ceding all of Berlin to East Germany, which he considered strategically far more important than Cuba in the Cold War. Khrushchev said he wished to confront the Americans "with more than words … the logical answer was missiles" (Weldes, 1999, p. 29 16 Kennedy said about the meeting, "He beat the hell out of me," and he told New York Times reporter James Reston, "It was the worst thing in my life. He savaged me." Khrushchev told his son, Sergei, that if missiles were installed in Cuba, Kennedy "would make a fuss, make more of a fuss, and then agree" to their deployment (Kempe, 2011, p. 257 ).
Consequently, it seemed predictable that the Soviets would choose to withdraw their missiles while trying to wring concessions from the United States. This included, as noted earlier, a promise by the United States not to invade Cuba as well as a secret agreement to withdraw its missiles from Turkey.
As terrifying as the Cuban missile crisis was, it led to the establishment of a hot line between the superpowers-and other stabilizing measures-which played a significant role in alleviating subsequent international crises. By correctly predicting that Khrushchev would back down from his belligerent stance at the outset of the crisis, Kennedy was able not only to defuse it but set in motion later steps that clearly had favorable long-term consequences.
The Iran Agreement on Nuclear Weapons: A Class II Game
In 2012, fifty years after the Cuban missile crisis, several countries and the International Atomic Energy Agency feared that Iran might be attempting to develop a nuclear capability that could be used for military purposes. Israel, in particular, believed that Iran was enriching uranium in order to develop nuclear weapons that could be used against it. It had suspected such surreptitious activities earlier, but it claimed in 2012 that they posed an imminent threat to its existence.
Iran denied that developing nuclear weapons was its intention, despite the discovery of previously hidden nuclear-production facilities. It said that it desired to enrich uranium only as an alternative energy source to be used for civilian purposes. States "will always have Israel's back," which signaled that he was supportive of Israel's concern but did not spell out exactly what the United States would do to aid Israel.
To go back a few decades to the1970s, Israel began producing, but never publicly acknowledged possessing, nuclear weapons, though it is now presumed to have about eighty nuclear warheads (Arms Control Association, 2016) . It did say, however, that it would not be the first party to introduce them into a conflict.
In claiming that Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons threatened its existence, Israel implied that it would use every means short of nuclear weapons to arrest Iran's development of them if economic sanctions or covert actions failed. The latter had included assassinations and cyberwarfare. Indeed, the latter had significantly disrupted Iran's enrichment of uranium.
Unlike the superpowers during the Cold War, Israel was unwilling to rely on its own nuclear deterrent and MAD, perhaps in part because it feared that terrorists could gain control of Iranian nuclear weapons and act "crazily," without concern for what Israel's response might be. Also, Israel's small physical size made its survival an issue, even after it retaliated from an attack, whereas Iran's ability to absorb a retaliatory strike was greater, possibly giving it an incentive to preempt with nuclear weapons.
We present in Figure 7 In summary, we have argued that the conflict between Iran and Israel over Iran's possible development of nuclear weapons can plausibly be represented by game 27, in which Israel is P and Iran is Q. Given Israel's probability of correct prediction is sufficiently high, which we assume is known by Iran, and it chooses in accordance with its preferences in game 27, it is in Iran's interest to choose not to develop nuclear weapons for two reasons: (i) its fear of an attack on its production facilities; and (ii) the continued tightening of economic sanctions (this is not in our game as such but seems to have been a major factor in inducing Iran to reach a settlement 21 ).
Conclusions
We postulated a 2-person game in which one player, Predictor (P), does not have a dominant strategy but can predict with probability p > 1/2 the strategy choice of an opponent, Predictee (Q). Q chooses a strategy that maximizes her expected payoff, given that she knows p-but not P's prediction-and that P will act according to his prediction.
In all 2 2 strict ordinal games in which there is a unique Pareto-inferior Nash equilibrium (Class I) or no pure-strategy equilibrium (Class II), and a non-Nash Paretooptimal cooperative outcome, P can induce the cooperative outcome if his predictions are 21 Tightening of sanctions could be modeled as a deterioration of Iran's payoff at (4,1) in game 27 to (3,1), and a complementary increase of its payoff at (3,4) to (4,4), yielding a no-conflict game that has two Nash equilibrium outcomes, (4,4) and (2,3). Obviously, the Pareto-superior (4,4) outcome would be more appealing to both sides, but neither equilibrium in this game, as in the symmetric game, Stag Hunt, is supported by a dominant strategy, as D is in game 27. It seems probable that this deterioration for Iran had not yet occurred in 2015, so the prediction model seems the more plausible explanation of why a settlement was reached.
× sufficiently accurate. This outcome gives each player at least a next-best payoff. It seems to have occurred in a Class I game that models the 1962 Cuban missile crisis between the United States and the Soviet Union, and in a Class II game that models the 2015 conflict between Iran and Israel over Iran's possible development of nuclear weapons.
We first considered the representation of the Cuban missile crisis as a game of Chicken (game 57) but then suggested that the non-Nash cooperative (3,3) outcome was realized in a different game (game 30t), which better models the preferences of the two players. In the latter game, which is a Class I prediction game in which there is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, the United States correctly predicted that a blockade would qbe sufficient to induce the Soviet Union to withdraw its missiles from Cuba, though it held out the possibility of escalation to an air strike if the Soviets did not withdraw their missiles. Aware of U.S. intelligence capabilities and making a probable expected-payoff calculation, the Soviet Union acceded to the U.S. demand for withdrawal of its missiles after the United States agreed to certain concessions.
In the Iran-Israel conflict over the Iran's possible development of nuclear weapons, the agreement reached in 2015 seems to have been fostered by Israel's strong intelligence and Iran's awareness of it. It seems that Iran abandoned its dominant strategy in a Class II prediction game (game 27), moving the conflict from a possible Pareto-inferior Nash equilibrium to a Pareto-superior non-Nash cooperative outcome.
The lesson from both our theoretical model and the empirical cases is that good predictions by P, and knowledge of P's capability by Q, can stabilize a non-Nash Paretooptimal cooperative outcome in eight prediction games. Surprisingly, Q does not need to know P's prediction but only the probability that it is correct for the players to choose, with this probability, the cooperative outcome in these games.
That this salutary result occurs not only in theory but also in practice underscores the critical role that information can play in helping to resolve serious international conflicts. To induce cooperative outcomes in prediction games, it is in the interest of P, who does not have a dominant strategy, to be able to predict with reasonable accuracy the choice of Q, and for Q to understand that P has this capability.
